Precarious Positions: Native Hawaiians and US Federal Recognition by Kauanui, J Kehaulani
The conspirators, having actually gained possession of the
machinery of government, and the recognition of foreign min-
isters, refused to surrender their conquest. So it happens that,
overawed by the power of the United States to the extent that
they can neither themselves throw off the usurpers, nor obtain
assistance from other friendly states, the people of the Islands
have no voice in determining their future, but are virtually
relegated to the condition of the aborigines of the American
continent.
hrh lili‘uokalani,
Hawaii’s Story by Hawaii’s Queen
Queen Lili‘uokalani’s words of anger and frustration at the raw power
used by the United States in relation to Native Hawaiian people during the
late nineteenth century resonate strongly with twenty-first century indig-
enous resistance to attempts to reduce Native Hawaiians to the political
status of American Indians.1 A proposal currently before the US Congress
would recognize a Native Hawaiian nation within the confines of US fed-
eral policy for Native Americans. Beginning in the 106th US Congress in
2000 and continuing through the present, Senator Daniel Akaka, a Demo-
crat from the State of Hawai‘i, introduced this federal legislation, which
proposes to recognize Hawaiians as an indigenous people who have a
“special relationship” with the United States and thus a right to limited
self-determination. Passage of the bill would lay the foundation for a
nation-within-a-nation model of self-governance and would redefine
Native Hawaiians’ current legal status in ways that parallel the political
1
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume 17, Number 1, 1–27
© 2005 by University of Hawai‘i Press
Precarious Positions: Native Hawaiians
and US Federal Recognition
J Këhaulani Kauanui
 
2 the contemporary pacific • 17:1 (2005)
process used to subjugate American Indian tribal nations. US law has
defined tribal sovereignty, already a contested concept, as the right of
tribes as “domestic dependent nations” to exercise limited self-determina-
tion and the right to self-government. Federally recognized tribes have the
right to assert jurisdiction over their people and their land; define their
own tribal membership criteria; create tribal legislation, law enforcement,
and court systems; and tax their own citizens. 
This essay examines the impetus for the federal recognition proposal.
It also explores a range of historical and legal issues that shed light on the
multiple claims constituting the complex terrain of Hawaiian sovereignty
politics. The proposal for federal recognition is extremely controversial for
several reasons. For one, it was initiated by a US federal representative,
not the Native Hawaiian people,2 as a remedy against new political
developments in the courts that threaten current US federal funding and
programs for Native Hawaiians. Second, numerous Hawaiian political
organizations oppose what they see as an effort to contain Hawai‘i’s inde-
pendence claim under international law. Third, there is local opposition,
on the part of non-Hawaiian residents of Hawai‘i, to this form of recog-
nition. And fourth, there is rampant opposition in the US Senate from
Republicans who condemn this proposal because it would extend to
Native Hawaiians distinct rights. However, their conservative antago-
nism is slowly shifting to qualified support.
I first provide a historical overview of the events that impact the cur-
rent situation and provide a legal basis for US federal recognition. Then
I discuss a particular set of contemporary conditions that serve as key ele-
ments in catalyzing widespread support for federal recognition—namely,
the implications of the recent US Supreme Court ruling in Rice v Caye-
tano (2000) and subsequent legal challenges to Native Hawaiian pro-
grams and funding by the US government. I also discuss the broader con-
text for recognizing Native Hawaiians as an indigenous people within the
United States—stemming from a much longer history of incorporating
Native Hawaiians within the definition of “Native American.” I then high-
light some of the difficulties with the promise of federal recognition as a
solution to “the Hawaiian problem” by looking at lessons from Indian
Country, Native Alaska, and the Pacific—especially the US unincorpo-
rated territories. In conclusion, I delineate the legal claims that exceed the
US federal model and point to the alternative activist strategies Native
Hawaiians and others in Hawai‘i are pursuing.
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A History of Illegality
A series of critical historical events provide the backdrop for understand-
ing the complex terrain of Hawaiian sovereignty politics. In 1893, US
Minister of Foreign Affairs John L Stevens, with the support of a dozen
white settlers, organized a coup d’etat and overthrew Queen Lili‘uokalani,
the monarch of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i (Trask 1993; Kent 1993; Fuchs
1961). The queen yielded her authority under protest, as she was confi-
dent that the US government and President Harrison would endeavor to
undo the actions led by one of its ministers. Within months, however, Har-
rison was out of office and Grover Cleveland became the next US presi-
dent. Eventually, after sending an investigator on the matter, Cleveland
declared the action under Stevens an “act of war” and acknowledged that
the coup, backed by US marines, had been unlawful and should be
undone. Specifically, he recommended that the provisional government
(made up of those who had orchestrated the overthrow) should step down
—but they refused. Cleveland did not compel them to do so and thus did
not assist in restoring formal recognition to the queen. In the meantime,
the provisional government established the Republic of Hawai‘i on 4 July
1894, with Sanford Ballard Dole as president. As the de jure government,
asserting jurisdiction over the entire Island archipelago, this group seized
roughly 1.8 million acres—Hawaiian Kingdom government and Crown
lands (Coffman 1998). In 1898, when the United States illegally annexed
Hawai‘i, the republic then ceded these same lands, under the condition
that they be held in trust for the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands (Silva
1998; Coffman 1998; Hasager and Friedman 1994). 
In her groundbreaking research, Noenoe K Silva has brought to light a
powerful resistance history that reveals broad-based Hawaiian opposi-
tion to US annexation—opposition so strong that it successfully defeated
a proposed treaty of annexation in 1897 (Silva 1998, 2004). Hawaiians
organized into two key nationalist groups—Hui Aloha ‘Äina and Hui
Kälai‘äina—each of which submitted petitions representing the vast
majority of Hawaiian people alive in Hawai‘i at the time. In those peti-
tions, called the Kü‘ë Petitions (kü‘ë translates “to oppose, resist, pro-
test”), Hawaiians clearly stated their opposition to becoming part of the
United States in any way. The US Senate accepted these petitions but
found it impossible to secure the two-thirds majority vote required in the
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Senate for a treaty. However, this did not stop the US government. Dur-
ing US President McKinley’s term, the Republic of Hawai‘i and other pro-
annexationists proposed a joint resolution of Congress, which required
only a simple majority in both houses—and so the Newlands Resolution
passed in 1898.3 Thus, the United States did not annex the Hawaiian
Islands by treaty, as required under customary international law at the
time. Furthermore, annexation of Hawai‘i as a new territory (and not a
state) violated the US Constitution.4
To many outsiders today, the history of the illegal overthrow and
annexation may seem irrelevant, given the fact that Hawai‘i is counted as
one of the fifty states of the United States of America. But as many Hawai-
ian activists point out, statehood is also contestable. Like many other colo-
nial territories, in 1946 Hawai‘i was inscribed on the United Nations list
of non-self-governing territories. As such, Hawai‘i was eligible for decol-
onization under international law. However, the United States—in clear
violation of UN policy and international law—predetermined statehood
as the status for Hawai‘i. The US federal government approved a state-
hood bill for Hawai‘i based on a vote conducted by the colonial territor-
ial government. Yet, Hawai‘i was entitled to a plebiscite as mandated by
the UN Charter, Chapter XI, Article 73, and General Assembly Resolu-
tion 742, regarding the process of non-self-governing territories pursuing
self-determination and a form of self-government. In other words, a plebi-
scite should have been undertaken with UN supervision, rather than deter-
mined by an internal administrating body of the US government.5 After
elections for state senators and one representative, the United States
admitted Hawai‘i as a state of the union on 21 August 1959. In turn, the
US representative reported to the UN secretary-general that Hawai‘i had
become the fiftieth state and requested that it be taken off the list of non-
self-governing territories, a major step back from the process of restoring
national sovereignty.
Basis for Federal Recognition
There are two key legal bases for the argument supporting federal recog-
nition for Native Hawaiians: the “Apology Resolution” (Public Law 103-
150) regarding the 1893 overthrow, passed by Congress in 1993; and the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920. Both the resolution and the
act are cited in any legal genealogy affirming the US obligation to Native
Hawaiian people. Although it contains no mention of the annexation, the
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Apology Resolution acknowledges US complicity in the overthrow of
Queen Lili‘uokalani and the constitutional monarchy. Besides accounting
for the events that led to the US-backed coup, the resolution also acknowl-
edges that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished
their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national
lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a
plebiscite or referendum.”6 Importantly, this resolution defines “Native
Hawaiian” inclusively as “any individual who is a descendent of the abo-
riginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in
the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii.” Although the apology
includes a disclaimer at the very end, stating that nothing contained can
be used to settle a case against the United States, it still constitutes a find-
ing of fact. The other legal basis for federal recognition is the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act of 1920, approved by the US Congress in 1921,
which allotted approximately 200,000 acres of land, with ninety-nine-year
lease provisions, to those who qualify as “native Hawaiians.” In this case,
“native Hawaiians” are defined as “descendants with at least one-half
blood quantum of individuals inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to
1778.”7 These allotted lands were formerly part of the Crown and gov-
ernment lands of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. The Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission Act was originally conceived as a Native rehabilitation project
for the Hawaiian population, which had been experiencing dramatic
depopulation linked to colonial urbanization. The act has been cited as
evidence that the US government already acknowledged that one class of
Hawaiians (those with 50 percent or more blood quantum) has entitle-
ments that parallel those of American Indians (Kauanui 1999). The act
also arguably institutionalized a trust agreement, constituting a special
legal relationship.
As early as 1903, the US federal government passed legislation acknowl-
edging the indigenous people of Hawai‘i, and currently over 160 federal
statutes address the conditions of Native Hawaiians (Inouye 2003). Since
the 1970s, in the midst of a thriving Hawaiian rights movement, the US
Congress has enacted numerous special provisions of law for the benefit
of Native Hawaiians in the areas of health, education, labor, and hous-
ing. Thus it could be argued that the US Congress has already recognized
that a special relationship exists between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people. The US Congress extended to Native Hawaiians the
same rights and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska Native,
Inuit, and Aleut communities in the Native American Programs Act of
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1974. This act also includes American Samoan Natives, and indigenous
peoples of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the Republic of Palau—all designated as “Native American Pacific
Islanders.” And Native Hawaiians are also included in the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act, National Museum of the American Indian
Act, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, National
Historic Preservation Act, and Native American Languages Act.8 In addi-
tion, there are several federal acts specific to Native Hawaiians, compa-
rable to those providing for American Indians and Alaskan Natives, such
as the Native Hawaiian Health Care Act and the Native Hawaiian Edu-
cation Act.9 Whether all this legislation qualified Native Hawaiians as
politically analogous to American Indians was a key question brought
before the US Supreme Court in 1999 and in subsequent challenges to
Hawaiian rights to state and federal funding and indigenous-specific insti-
tutions, such as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (oha) and the Depart-
ment of Hawaiian Home Lands (dhhl).
RICE V CAYETANO and the Context of 
Continuous Anti-Hawaiian Assault
The US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Rice v Cayetano in February
2000 served as the central impetus for the proposal regarding federal
recognition of Hawaiians. At stake in the Rice case were restricted elec-
tions for oha trustees, along with the very existence of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs. Prior to the court ruling, participation in oha elec-
tions was restricted to Native Hawaiians, of any Hawaiian ancestry, who
resided in Hawai‘i. Harold F Rice, a fourth-generation white resident of
Hawai‘i, was denied the right to vote because he is not Hawaiian by any
statutory definition (he is neither “native Hawaiian” nor “Native Hawai-
ian”). The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, established in 1978, is governed by
a nine-member elected board of trustees and holds title to all real or per-
sonal property set aside or conveyed to it through the state Admission Act
of 1959 as part of the Ceded Public Lands Trust. It is also meant to hold
the income and proceeds derived from a portion of a trust for “native
Hawaiians” as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and
granted to the State of Hawai‘i at the time it was admitted to the union in
1959 (MacKenzie 1991). As the plaintiff, Rice charged that both the trust
managed by the office and the oha voting provisions were racially dis-
criminatory and violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
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the US Constitution, which, respectively, are meant to provide equal pro-
tection, and to guarantee that the right of citizens to vote shall not be
denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. But even though the trust itself is for the benefit of “native
Hawaiians,” the US Supreme Court’s majority opinion decreed that the
state’s electoral restriction enacted race-based voting qualifications and
thereby violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 
In Rice v Cayetano, Hawaiians were in a fraught position, with no
direct voice in the case, even though it was central to Hawaiian con-
cerns.10 Then-Governor Cayetano, notorious for his anti-Hawaiian veto
power, was held accountable for the oha voting practices because the
office is a state agency. Still, the State of Hawai‘i argued that the oha lim-
itation on the right to vote was based not on race but on the unique sta-
tus of Hawaiian people in light of the state’s trust obligations. Thus the
limitation on the right to vote for the oha trustees was based on a legal
classification defining those people who are the beneficiaries of the trust.
But because neither the US federal government nor the US Supreme Court
recognizes Hawaiians collectively as a sovereign entity, the State of
Hawai‘i maintained that the voting classification was rationally tied to its
requirement to uphold a congressional requirement—in other words,
because the United States has a “special relationship” with and obligation
to “native Hawaiians” stemming from the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920.11 Thus the defense in the Rice case rested on the claim that
Congress has the power to enter into special trust relationships with indig-
enous peoples—a power that is not confined to tribal Indians—and that
the state “stood in for” the United States with regard to land claims and
related entitlements.12 The last part of this argument seemed most threat-
ening to the US Supreme Court. However, these state obligations to
Hawai‘i’s indigenous people did not convince the Supreme Court of the
unique political situation of Hawaiians, a status that may have justified
the exclusive oha election process. 
Favoring Rice, the majority Supreme Court opinion based its ruling on
three major findings. First, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was under-
stood only as an arm of the state and not as a mechanism to fulfill the
trust commitments delegated to the state by the federal government. So,
because the oha trustee elections are administered by the state rather
than by a separate quasi-sovereign body (such as a federally recognized
tribal government), the Fifteenth Amendment applies. Second, the court
found that the limited voting franchise failed to comply with the Fifteenth
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Amendment. Third, it was not clear to the court that the voting classifi-
cation was symmetrical with the beneficiaries of the programs that office
administers; while the bulk of funds appear to be designated for “native
Hawaiians” (as per the 50-percent rule), “Native Hawaiians” who reside
in the state were also allowed to vote in the oha elections. Thus, in the
end, the court identified what it saw as an asymmetrical relationship
between the Hawaiian-specific voting process and the beneficiaries of the
trust.13 In the end, they declared that the oha voting restrictions violated
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
To some, the Rice case may seem marginal in relation to the overall
political climate in the United States. Yet, Theodore Olsen—well known
for his legal representation of the current US president in Bush v Gore
(2000), and now serving as US solicitor general—was also the legal coun-
sel for Rice. And Rice himself, in pursuing his role as the plaintiff, was
financed by the Campaign for a Color-Blind America, Robert Bork, Amer-
icans against Discrimination and Preferences, the United States Justice
Foundation, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the New York Civil Rights
Coalition, and the Pacific Legal Foundation—all of which submitted legal
briefs on his behalf. These extremely conservative right-wing think tanks
have been central in a nationwide attack on affirmative action and other
civil rights gains in the United States. The case also implicates political
standing that exceeds these rights.
In addition, the ruling in Rice raises various questions about the consti-
tutional rights of residents in the US insular territories, indicating that the
Rice case has implications beyond the Hawaiian situation.14 For example,
as Rice v Cayetano was first heard before the US Court of Appeals, Con-
gressman Faleomavaega from American Sämoa noted that the ruling not
only put the oha elections in jeopardy but could also potentially affect
the Samoan system of land tenure and chiefly titles. Prior to the decision,
Faleomavaega noted, “Should the Supreme Court rule against the Native
Hawaiians and hold that this US citizen was being discriminated against,
the decision will have far-reaching implications for American Samoa’s
future—as this would allow any US citizen living in American Samoa to
challenge American Samoa’s laws.” Further, he pointed out, “This raises
my concern because legal scholars in the US do not consider our ‘treaties’
with the US to be ‘treaties’ in the technical sense, but ‘deeds of cession,’
which are considered of lesser authority than the US Constitution” (PIR
1999). Therefore, any rights seen as privileging Samoans over other US
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citizens residing in American Sämoa are vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenges of racial discrimination.
The majority opinion in Rice v Cayetano did not rule on the Four-
teenth Amendment and thus did not affect the trust that the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs is meant to manage. Nevertheless, the ruling has laid
the essential groundwork for further assaults on Hawaiian lands and peo-
ple, and indeed, several more lawsuits are now in motion. These new
cases threaten the existence of all Hawaiian-specific funding sources and
institutions, including the Office of Hawaiian Affairs; all federal funds for
Hawaiian health, education, and housing; and the state Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands and the lands it manages. Plaintiffs charge that
these institutions are racially discriminatory because they violate the US
Constitution’s equal-protection clause. 
These suits have led to increased political tensions in the Islands. In
March 2002, a group of Hawai‘i residents tried to stop state spending for
programs offered by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the Hawaiian
Homes Commission, though US District Judge Susan Oki Mollway denied
a temporary restraining order requested by the group (Omandam 2002).
Among the sixteen plaintiffs—Earl F Arakaki, Evelyn C Arakaki, Edward
U Bugarin, Sandra P Burgess, Patricia Carroll, Robert M Chapman, Brian
L Clarke, Michael Y Garcia, Roger Grantham, Toby M Kravet, James I
Kuroiwa Jr, Fran Nichols, Donna M Scaff, Jack H Scaff, Allen Teshima,
and Thurston Twigg-Smith—are state politicians and direct descendants
of the first missionaries. They are currently challenging the constitution-
ality of both agencies because of allegations that their “race-based pro-
grams” discriminate against non-Hawaiians. Still, even while the judge
denied their immediate request, the plaintiffs had standing to go forward
with their lawsuit because, as taxpayers, they can challenge the use of state
money to fund oha and dhhl programs. The plaintiffs asked that the
state stop spending state tax revenues for both programs. By March 2003
the case was filed in federal court on their behalf.
Shortly after the case was filed, in November 2003, District Judge Moll-
way dismissed the state Department of Hawaiian Home Lands/Hawaiian
Homes Commission and the US federal government as parties to the law-
suit. Mollway ruled that the plaintiffs could not challenge the federal
requirements for the Hawaiian Home Lands program because, based on
a recent Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, the plaintiffs would
have to challenge federal law to challenge the corresponding state law. In
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her ruling Mollway noted, “State taxpayer standing is too limited to per-
mit a challenge to a federal law and therefore does not allow plaintiffs to
challenge the Hawaiian Home Lands lease program, which is mandated
by both state and federal law” (quoted in Barayuga 2003). Some feel that
the agency’s dismissal from the lawsuit validates its legal standing. Now,
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs is the sole remaining defendant in the law-
suit. According to Jon Van Dyke, one of the attorneys representing the
office, it should also be dismissed from the case because it was also estab-
lished pursuant to the Admission Act of 1959 for the State of Hawai‘i
(Barayuga 2003). 
H William Burgess, attorney for the plaintiffs, said “that when consid-
ering a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court is required to take
the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and to construe it in favor of the plain-
tiffs” (Barayuga 2003). In his estimation, the court basically disregarded
that precedent and made what amounted to factual determinations: “She
says the Admissions Act doesn’t have any causal connection to the tax-
payer injury that the plaintiffs are suffering, and that’s just contrary to
the law” (quoted in Barayuga 2003). Some speculate that a person who
applied for a Hawaiian Home Lands lease and was turned down solely
because he or she was not Native Hawaiian could mount a more effective
challenge. In other words, plaintiffs could apply for Hawaiian Homes
leases, be turned down because they do not meet the 50-percent blood cri-
terion for leasing eligibility, and then have standing to continue their racial
discrimination lawsuit. Hawaiian activist Isaac Harp has recommended
that oha trustees begin work on amending the requirements for the
Hawaiian Home Lands program and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, to
benefit the descendants of citizens of the nation prior to 17 January 1893
who were not of Hawaiian ancestry but were nonetheless Hawai‘i nation-
als under the kingdom. Utilizing an occupation analysis rather than a colo-
nial analysis in the case of Hawai‘i, Harp has suggested, “would elimi-
nate the racist component because the issue is one of nationality not race”
(e-mail to the Hawaii-Independence listserve, 8 Feb 2004). Although this
strategy affirms and promotes the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom,
which allowed for citizenship without regard for race, the promotion of
a color-blind agenda neglects the long history of US policies directed spe-
cially at Native Hawaiians, which worked to hasten both dispossession
and assimilation.
Within this context of legal assault, where any indigenous-specific pro-
gram is deemed racist, many Hawaiians and their allies support Senator
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Akaka’s proposal for federal recognition. To most, the bill is understood
as a protective measure against such lawsuits. The bill originated in
March 2000, just one month after the ruling in Rice, when Hawai‘i’s con-
gressional delegation formed a Task Force on Native Hawaiian Issues,
chaired by Senator Akaka. As its immediate goal, the task force aimed to
clarify the political relationship between Hawaiians and the United States
through the US Congress. Senator Akaka has described the proposal as the
reconciliation legislation he first tried to spearhead over a decade ago,
which at the time amounted to the Apology Resolution. Now his goals
have different implications. Beginning in 2000, during the 106th US Con-
gress, the senator introduced federal legislation that proposes to recog-
nize Hawaiians as indigenous people who have a “special relationship”
with the United States and thus a right to self-determination under fed-
eral law. Passage of the bill would lay the foundation for a nation-within-
a-nation model of self-governance, parallel to that of recognized American
Indian tribes. Because federal recognition would redefine Hawaiians as a
political entity, challenges of “racial” distinctions would likely be moot in
terms of equal protection under the US Constitution.15 Federal protection
is now being sold to Hawaiians as a defense against average citizens who
challenge the Hawaiian trusts that the United States never upheld in the
first place, trusts that are based on the theft of a nation.16
These political misdeeds continue to go unquestioned and have prob-
lematic implications for the future, as can be seen even in the process of
drafting and putting forth the proposal. Not only has the proposal
involved little Hawaiian participation in its development, but it has also
served as a political football, blocked by conservatives. For example, only
for the very earliest draft of the bill (s 2899), back in 2000, were hearings
held in Hawai‘i, and only in Honolulu. Despite widespread opposition to
the bill, s 2899 was introduced in the 106th Congress, where it did not
survive the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. The next version of the
bill (s 81) was soon introduced but did not pass. After major revision, the
bill was reintroduced in the 107th Congress, designated as s 746. In
December 2001, Republicans opposing the bill pulled it out of a defense
spending measure, where it had been slipped in without the knowledge of
the Hawaiian people. Subsequently, the bill was drafted yet again, osten-
sibly to make it more palatable to right-wing opponents in the US Senate,
who already construe any set of self-governing rights for indigenous peo-
ples as “racial preferences.” Those changes were reflected in the next bill,
s 1783, which also did not pass due to Republican opposition in the Sen-
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ate. In February 2003, during the 108th Congress, the proposal reemerged
as s 344, a bill that was very much like the one immediately before. But
conservative forces in the Senate continue to refuse support for the mea-
sure, especially since the Bush administration has yet to take a position
on the legislation (Viotti 2003a). 
All throughout 2003, s 344 was revised in ways designed to further
limit Hawaiian claims and appeal to right-wing interests. On 12 May
2003, the Hawai‘i congressional delegation agreed to make revisions to
the recognition bill. Some of these revisions are: (1) a federal Office for
Native Hawaiian Relations would compile and maintain a roll of Hawai-
ians willing and eligible to participate in a new Hawaiian government; (2)
people who felt they had been excluded from the roll could appeal to the
US Department of the Interior; (3) Hawaiians on the roll could form an
interim governing council to develop the structure and scope of a new gov-
ernment; and (4) the interim council would disband once elected officers
of a new government take office (DePledge 2003). The bill was revised yet
again on 22 June 2003 to make it more appealing to right-wing opposi-
tion, a strategy that seems to be necessary to gain support in the Senate.
Despite efforts to stall the bill in the Senate, in mid-2003, Republican
Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska decided to cosponsor the bill with Senator
Akaka. Stevens’s support seems especially important given that he is chair
of the US Senate Appropriations Committee and holds a lot of political
sway. Jumping on the bandwagon, Republican Senator Gordon Smith
from Oregon announced that he would lend his support, after Hawai‘i
Governor Linda Lingle met with him to discuss the proposal in late 2003
(Borreca 2003a). One other Republican senator also vowed his support
as of December 2003—Orin Hatch of Utah. US Representative Ed Case,
a Democrat from Hawai‘i, has noted that he believes that support from
the Bush administration is important to gaining federal recognition for
Hawaiians, especially in the face of Republican opposition in the Senate
(Arakawa 2003). 
US Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawai‘i (also a Democrat) explained the
delay in passing the federal recognition legislation by pointing to the Sen-
ate being overwhelmed by appropriation bills (Viotti 2003b), which are
no doubt linked to the US imperial presence in Iraq. Furthermore, Sena-
tor Inouye said it was his intent to push the bill through before the end
of session in 2004. He also noted that political unity in Hawai‘i—which
includes support from Governor Linda Lingle, all of the state’s mayors,
county and state lawmakers, and the entire US congressional delegation
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—should go a long way in helping to secure Republican support in the
Senate (Borreca 2003a, 2003b; Viotti 2003b). Lingle herself declared
before the US Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that passage of the
proposal was “vital to the continued character of our state, and it is vital
to providing parity and consistency in federal policy for all native peoples
in America” (Borreca 2003b). Still, as of July 2004, the Senate had not
passed the bill. 
During all of this political maneuvering, the Hawaiian people were left
out of the fray. In response to this omission, the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs launched a campaign to educate the people of Hawai‘i about issues
relating to the legislation. According to oha trustee Boyd Mossman (a
retired Second Circuit Court judge), “oha is now attempting to accom-
plish in two to three years what has not been accomplished in the last 110
years by achieving federal recognition and creating a governing entity for
Hawaiians that will assist Hawaiians in defending against the equal-rights
lawsuits pending in the federal courts. In this way, we believe we will be
able to prevail in court and preserve not only the benefits and entitlements
received by Native Hawaiians today, but also preserve the Hawaiian peo-
ple and the Hawaiian culture” (Mossman 2003). He continued: 
Hawaiians can survive as a unique people with federal recognition . . .
If we fail, if we lose in the courts, if we cannot convince Congress of the
potential elimination of an entire people who politically once ruled themselves,
if we cannot convince the Hawaiians themselves and bring them together in a
united effort, then you will have seen the last of the Hawaiians as we know
them today. Hawaiians will be no different than Californians, Georgians, New
Yorkers, etc. We will no longer be identified as the descendants of a once-proud
nation with a unique history, language and identity. We will melt into history
and become a memory only. The recognition, trust, benefits and entitlements
heretofore provided the Hawaiian people will disappear, and oha’s trust fund,
Hawaiian homelands, the many state and federally funded programs address-
ing significant needs of Hawaiians will be no more and will likely not be
replaced by any state or charitable funding. (Mossman 2003)
Though his words resonated with many, Mossman was somewhat dis-
missive of those opposed to federal recognition on grounds that it will
work against Hawai‘i’s national claims under international law. He
asserted, “I am aware of those who rely on the United Nations and want
only complete independence from the United States as well as those argu-
ing equal rights who want an end to Hawaiian benefits, and I do not
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address these groups. They will not be interested in these words, and so
I address those who must wonder what recognition, nationhood, ceded-
lands settlement and equal rights for all [would mean]” (Mossman 2003). 
In a contradictory rhetorical strategy, Mossman stressed the concept of
political equality, which is already at odds with tribal sovereignty because
federal recognition for Natives within US policy is not premised on equal
treatment. In any case, opposition to the proposal goes beyond right-wing
reluctance to pass the measure expanding Hawaiian rights that Mossman
is addressing. As a result, some Hawaiians, along with others who support
an independent Hawai‘i and claims to nation-state status, have aligned
themselves with Republican opposition, partaking in their language con-
demning the bill on the basis of “special rights” and “racial preferences.”
But those who support Hawai‘i’s independence from the United States
have also pointed out problems with the proposal because of the limita-
tions on Hawaiian sovereign expression.
The Limits of Domestic Sovereignty: 
Lessons from other (Is)lands
It is not at all clear that the passing of this bill would protect anything,
given that the proposal itself, if passed, could be found to be unconstitu-
tional, because any literal reading of the US Constitution would deem
Hawaiians non-Indians. Hawaiians can look to cases from Indian Coun-
try and Native Alaska to shed light on the problems and pitfalls of fed-
eral recognition (Deloria and Lytle 1984). The proposal for Hawaiians is
modeled on similar legal precedents for over three hundred federally rec-
ognized American Indian tribal nations. Yet, it seems more likely that this
limited proposal would pave the way for an arrangement such as that of
over 229 Alaska Native villages, which is currently in a precarious posi-
tion. Alaskan Natives’ federal recognition status shifted radically between
the Clinton and Bush administrations. Under Clinton, they were listed on
the federal register of federally recognized nations, a status that was chal-
lenged under Bush.17 Moreover, their political status was recently dis-
puted, in the 1998 US Supreme Court case of Alaska v Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government, when the court ruled that Venetie’s land base
did not count as Indian Country in the legal sense. Because Indian Coun-
try is legally defined to include all dependent Indian communities in the
United States, Venetie Village did not qualify, because their lands are not
held in trust by the US federal government. Thus they cannot assess tax,
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enforce their own laws, or assert their jurisdiction over these lands as
American Indian governments do on reservations. Moreover, the Alaska
Native villages are subjected to Alaska state laws. 
At the very most, the Hawaiian self-governing model proposed through
the federal recognition process would allow for no more than a domestic
dependent entity under the full and exclusive plenary power of Congress
(Wilkins 1997). While US federal policy on Native Americans states that
the federal government must consult with tribal governments regarding
decisions about tribal lands, resources, and people, to honor the “gov-
ernment-to-government relationship,” the US Congress has a long history
of abusing its plenary power to subordinate tribal governments. Even
worse, the US Congress most often delegates its power to agencies in the
executive branch of the federal government, such as the Bureau of Indian
Affairs within the Department of the Interior, which is directed by presi-
dential appointees. To fully recognize Hawaiians as “Native Americans”
having a political trust relationship with the United States similar to that
of American Indians and Alaska Natives undercuts Hawaiian claims, par-
ticularly those to independent self-governance. 
Because of the limits posed to independent national sovereignty under
the proposed plan for federal recognition, dozens of Hawaiian sovereignty
groups have persistently and consistently rejected the application of US
federal Indian law that would recognize a Hawaiian domestic dependent
nation—as ward to guardian—under the plenary power of Congress.
Moreover, the exercise of federal plenary power not only comes from the
Congress, the president, and the Department of the Interior—it also comes
from the US Supreme Court, which has notoriously been ruling against
tribal power for Indian nations and increasing the power of the states
over them (Wilkins 1997). The US Supreme Court construes the powers
granted by the US Constitution to the Congress through its interpretation
of the Indian Commerce clause of the Constitution. Through a series of
precedents set by the rulings in Indian cases, the US Supreme Court has
ruled time and time again that the federal government has exclusive power
over Indian affairs (Wilkins 1997).
The proposed legislation is a violation of both sovereignty and self-
determination claims already acknowledged in the Apology Resolution.
Given that Hawaiian Kingdom sovereignty was not lost via conquest,
cession, or adjudication, those rights to self-rule are still in place under
international law. Hawaiian people lost the ability to be self-determining
through unilateral political processes—annexation and imposed statehood
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—but at no time did that amount to a legal termination of our inherent
rights of sovereignty. Moreover, passage of the legislation could be used
against Hawaiians and cited to show that claims that exceed the domes-
tic sphere have been forfeited, especially since by then the Hawaiian gov-
erning entity would be subject to US plenary power. This containment
of our sovereignty draws attention away from demands for Hawai‘i’s
independence and decolonization from the United States, based on inter-
national law. While the history of the overthrow can justify the right of
Hawaiians to federal recognition, that same history complicates any mode
of sovereignty that is exclusively aboriginal, especially since citizenship
under the Kingdom of Hawai‘i was not limited to Hawaiians. 
Hawaiian leaders of the various independence national initiatives argue
that those most in support of federal recognition do not represent the
Hawaiian people. Instead, those who work for the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, the Native Hawaiian
Health Project, and other agencies represent the state, federal, and non-
profit organizations for whom they work, the same institutions that
receive the funding being challenged in the courts. Therefore, supporting
the proposal for federal recognition ensures their continued employment.
On the other hand, the independence movement includes groups who
advocate decolonization of Hawai‘i from the United States or have self-
proclaimed the restoration or continued existence of the Kingdom of
Hawai‘i. “They’ve got to deal with us sooner or later—it will come down
to that,” said activist Dennis “Bumpy” Kanahele, leader of the Nation of
Hawai‘i (quoted in Omandam 2003). Attorney and activist Ho‘oipoka-
laena‘auao Nakea Pa, of Ke Kia‘i (the Native Hawaiian Advisory Coun-
cil) asserted, “The problem now is, our voices are not being heard in
Washington, and the resources and all the money is going into funding
pro-Akaka (bill) efforts at the price of our potential rights to indepen-
dence” (quoted in Omandam 2003). So not only have pro-independence
Hawaiian voices been silenced, their opposition to the bill has been mis-
represented as hostility to Hawaiian rights rather than protection of them.
In response to protests by those leading the struggle to restore Hawai‘i’s
independence, oha trustee Oswald Stender defended the proposal for
federal recognition and argued that it would do nothing to prohibit
claims beyond the federal model. He declared that “there are no guaran-
tees and the Akaka Bill guarantees nothing. It does only two things: (1) it
sets up the process for sovereignty and self-determination and (2) it gives
recognition that the Hawaiians are the aboriginal people of this land” 
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(e-mail posted to the kma [Kanaka Maoli Allies] listserve, 7 Nov 2003).
Yet, when one looks at the history of US federal recognition for indige-
nous domestic nations, it is clear that some guarantees do come along with
the process. For example, the proposed legislation sets up a process to
extinguish title to our Hawai‘i’s national lands—title that heretofore has
not been relinquished, as realized in the US Apology Resolution. That is,
once the bill sets up the process for the formation of a governing entity,
approved by the US federal government, the Hawaiian government offi-
cials elected by Hawaiian people would be in a position to waive the rights
and claims to independence under international law. In such a case, the
will of the people would appear to have been expressed—as a form of
self-determination in support of federal recognition—in a way that would
make international intervention more implausible, especially while the US
government would consider any Hawaiian question a domestic issue of
internal self-determination within its nation-state.
Besides the cases of American Indians and Alaska Natives, there are
lessons from other Pacific Islands. Two instructive examples are Guam and
American Sämoa, both of which are unincorporated US territories, orga-
nized and unorganized, respectively. Their histories shed light on the polit-
ical limitations of domestic governing entities within the US nation-state.
These two island entities are also subject to US congressional plenary
power under the authority of the Territorial Clause of the US Constitu-
tion, as interpreted by the US Supreme Court. Therefore, legal cases move
beyond the federal district courts anytime there is a question about their
sovereign power. These are then adjudicated by the US Supreme Court
under territorial case law, which upholds the doctrine that Guam and
American Sämoa are, along with Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands,
“foreign in a domestic sense,” not too different from tribal nations (Bur-
nett and Marshall 2001). Even the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands is subject to exclusive congressional power by the United
States and is working for an enhanced commonwealth status. 
Cases of successful disentanglement do exist to which Hawaiians can
turn as models. The only Island nations that have managed to extract
themselves from the grip of US plenary power are those of the former UN
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: the Republic of the Marshall Islands
(RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of
Belau. For example, after the US government entered into political status
negotiations with representatives of the peoples of the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, compacts of free association were
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signed in the Islands on 1 October 1982 and 25 June 1983, respectively.
In accordance with the Trusteeship Agreement, the Charter of the United
Nations, and the stated objective of the Trust Territory system, the United
States promoted the development of the peoples there toward self-gov-
ernment and independence according to the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples themselves. 
The compact was approved by majorities of the peoples of the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands in
UN-observed plebiscites, conducted on 21 June 1983 and 7 September
1983, respectively. Furthermore, the FSM and RMI governments were
formed on island prior to any negotiation with the United States. The
compact of free association was also approved by the FSM and RMI
governments in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Only after the FSM and RMI plebiscites was the compact approved as
a joint resolution (Public Law 99-239) by the US Congress on 14 Jan-
uary 1986.
The process of the compact agreement is instructive for Hawaiians in
that the order in which the political process unfolded in the Federated
States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands is strikingly different from
the process in which the proposal for federal recognition of Hawaiians has
taken place. In the case of the compact developments, there was a bilateral
process guided by the United Nations. First they held meetings, and then
the people approved the process. Next, prior to any negotiations with the
United States, they formed new governments, and these governing bodies
approved the compact proposals in accordance with their own constitu-
tional processes. Then the US Congress passed the legislation.
The compact also delineated a section to protect the unadjudicated
claims of the people of the Marshall Islands. For example, with regard to
the lands on Ejit (a small island in Majuro Atoll), the compact stated that
the president of the United States would negotiate an agreement with the
government of the Marshall Islands, without prejudice regarding any
claims that have been or may be asserted by any party as to rightful title
and ownership of any lands on Ejit. If Hawaiians were to consider
demanding a mutual-consent decree, to ensure bilateral agreements, a
section could also be included to preserve their title to the so-called ceded
lands—1.8 million acres of former Crown and government lands of the
Kingdom of Hawai‘i. A request for a mutual-consent decree would cer-
tainly be telling for pro–federal recognition forces, since when Chamorro
activists in Guam worked for the inclusion of a mutual-consent decree in
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their draft proposal for commonwealth status, the United States, through
the Department of the Interior, rejected it entirely. That rejection indicates
that the US government will continue to assert its plenary power over any
model other than independence.
Conclusion
At the very least, those supporting federal recognition would do well to
press for a plebiscite for Hawaiian people to vote on this model of sover-
eignty; then we would know for certain if it is the will of the people. It is
one thing for those against independence to opt out of that model of sov-
ereignty and pursue federal recognition. But whether people are informed
as they make their way toward this goal remains a question in the minds
of many. 
Now more than ever, it seems, Hawaiians and others wishing to protect
Hawai‘i’s national claims under international law must voice a resound-
ing statement of refusal to consent. Those advocating for independence
are divided between two central legal strategies: decolonization from the
United States through UN protocols, and US de-occupation through pro-
tocols mandated by the laws of occupation (Kauanui forthcoming). In the
case of unifying for the purposes of stopping federal recognition, the
legacy of the 1897 Kü‘ë Petitions is instructive. As mentioned earlier, two
different Hawaiian nationalist groups—Hui Aloha ‘Äina and Hui Kälai-
‘äina—widely opposed annexation. Hui Aloha ‘Äina’s petition unequiv-
ocally stated their resistance to US incorporation. The petition by Hui
Kälai‘äina went a step further by not only articulating their refusal of
incorporation, but also demanding the restoration of the Kingdom.
Although their goals differed, together they successfully defeated the 1897
Treaty of Annexation by demonstrating their lack of consent to becom-
ing part of the United States. Perhaps a similar strategy of working across
political differences for the purposes of stopping federal recognition could
indefinitely defer the proposal for a Hawaiian nation within the US pol-
icy for Native Americans. That sort of alliance would surely be more effec-
tive than pro-independence factions aligning themselves with conserva-
tive forces in the US Senate for the purposes of stopping the bill. 
It is true that prioritizing the independence claim in lieu of federal
recognition will not serve to protect the US federal funding for Hawaiians
now threatened by the lawsuits. But those worried primarily about pro-
tecting these funds should be urged to consider what they would be for-
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feiting in exchange for supporting the bill. While the federal-funding
stream to the State of Hawai‘i (for its agencies serving Hawaiians) is esti-
mated at $70 million per year—an amount that no doubt is crucial to alle-
viating Hawaiian suffering from the poverty and dispossession wrought
by neocolonialism—that amount is only 0.7 percent of the state’s entire
annual budget.18 With these figures providing some perspective, it would
seem that Hawaiians might have a better chance at de facto self-determi-
nation by remaining under the current state situation while pressing for-
ward on international claims and resisting any US federal recognition that
would foreclose our legitimate claims to independence. 
* * *
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Notes
1 This quote from Queen Lili‘uokalani (1964) was brought to my attention
by my friend Anne Keala Kelly, who highlighted it in one of the first investiga-
tive journal reports about the proposal for Hawaiian federal recognition (Kelly
2002).
2 Interestingly, back in 1987, the Hawaiian people organized into a sover-
eignty group called Ka Lähui Hawai‘i, with a membership roll of over 20,000
citizens, and initiated a proposal for federal recognition. But the Hawai‘i con-
gressional delegation, including Senators Akaka and Inouye, were opposed to the
plan, which leads people to wonder why they are so forcefully proposing it now.
[For more about Ka Lähui Hawai‘i and sovereignty issues, see the interview with
Mililani Trask, by Noe Noe Wong-Wilson, this issue, pages 142–156.] 
3 One hundred years later, the United Nations issued the findings of a nine-
year treaty study and called the annexation of Hawai‘i into legal question (Oman-
dam 1998). More specifically, it assessed the so-called annexation as invalid.
4 With regard to the authority to acquire and establish interim governments
for “acquired territories,” Chief Justice Taney stated, in Dred Scott v John F A
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Sanford (1856): “There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the
Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge
its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States.” Taney
noted that “it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for
admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and situation
would entitle it to admission,” and that the propriety of admitting a new state is
made by the discretion of Congress, the way that Hawai‘i became admitted as a
state over six decades later, in 1959. See the legal opinion generated by the US
Department of Justice in 1988: <http: //hawaiiankingdom.org/legal-opinion-1988
.shtml>.
5 After a massive increase in American migration to Hawai‘i, statehood
emerged as a real prospect. As early as 1950, two special elections were held to
choose sixty-three delegates who would draft a state constitution for Hawai‘i. In
addition, among those who were allowed to take part in the vote were settlers as
well as military personnel—who together outnumbered Hawaiians (Trask 1993).
6 Captain Cook first arrived in the island archipelago in 1778; thus that year
marks a time prior to which it is assumed that no one other than Hawaiians was
present in these Islands. Notably, the apology was not extended to non-Hawai-
ians who also endured the legacy of the overthrow—that is, those nonindigenous
descendants of citizens of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i.
7 For an analysis of what led to the 50 percent blood criterion, see Kauanui
1999, 2002.
8 However, it is also important to point out that data for Native Hawaiians,
Samoans, and other Pacific Islanders have historically been subsumed within the
pan-ethnic racial rubrics of “Asian and Pacific Islanders” and “Asian Pacific
Islanders.” This administrative practice has meant that all US data for Native
Pacific Islanders have been disaggregated and lumped with those of Asian Amer-
icans. It also obscures both the differences between the Asian and the Native
Pacific Islander subpopulations and the similarities in outcomes for Native Pacific
Islanders, American Indians, and Alaska Natives. Hopefully, the new “Hawaiian
and Other Pacific Islander” classification option provided in the 2000 US census
will inspire the US Office of Management and Budget to direct agencies to col-
lect meaningful racial data accordingly.
9 In all of these acts, Hawaiians are defined by the most inclusive definition:
“any individual who is a descendent of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778,
occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the State of
Hawai‘i.”
10 Some Hawaiian groups, including those pressing for federal recognition of
a Native governing entity, submitted amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs on
behalf of the respondent. The State Council of Hawaiian Homestead Associa-
tions, Hui Käko‘o ‘Äina Ho‘opulapula, Kalama‘ula Homestead Association, and
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the Hawaiian Homes Commission collectively submitted a brief. Another was
collectively submitted by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Ka Lähui, the Associa-
tion of Hawaiian Civic Clubs, the Council of Hawaiian Organizations, the Native
Hawaiian Convention, the Native Hawaiian Bar Association, the Native Hawai-
ian Legal Corporation, the Native Hawaiian Advisory Council, Hä Hawai‘i, Hui
Kälai‘äina, Alu Like Inc, and Papa Ola Lökahi. The Kamehameha Schools Bishop
Estate Trust also offered amici curiae, as did the Hawai‘i congressional delegation
and the National Congress of American Indians. Moreover, the solicitor general
at that time—Seth Waxman—also wrote a brief representing the Department
of Justice in support of Cayetano. The governments of Alabama, California,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, the Territory of Guam,
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands did as well. It should
not go unmentioned that among the amici curiae briefs for the petitioner, one
was submitted from a Hawaiian group called Hou Hawaiians and a man named
Maui Loa—who all identified themselves as “Native Hawaiian beneficiaries.”
They backed Rice and claimed that the Office of Hawaiian Affairs—by allowing
Hawaiians who do not meet the 50 percent blood quantum rule to vote—vio-
lated the trust for those Hawaiians who do meet the criterion.
11 The court determined that it would subject the legislation in question to
rational basis analysis rather than to strict scrutiny, dictating all other cases under-
stood as race-based. In Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena (1995), the Supreme
Court ruled, “a group classification such as one based on race is ordinarily sub-
jected to detailed judicial scrutiny to ensure that the personal right to equal pro-
tection of laws has not been infringed. Under this reasoning, even supposedly
benign racial classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny.”
12 The perversion here is that Hawaiians—as a people—cannot press land
claims against the state because of their wardship status.
13 Justices Breyer and Souter concurred with the majority but took their opin-
ion one step further, in that they denied the analogy between the relationship of
Native Hawaiians to the US federal government and that of American Indians.
In addition, they argued that there is no trust for Native Hawaiians and that the
oha electorate, defined by statute, did not sufficiently resemble an “Indian tribe.”
14 There are questions as to what the constitutional rights of US citizens who
live in the US territories include. What are the rights and privileges of the resi-
dents (indigenous and nonindigenous) of these islands under the US Constitution
and international law? Which provisions of the US Constitution apply in these
islands? See Van Dyke 1992.
15 Morton v Mancari (1974), the US Supreme Court case that upheld Amer-
ican Indian preferences as constitutional, established the precedent that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantees are not infringed by legislation
that benefits American Indians because of their political relationship to the United
States. But whether this case would be used regarding Hawaiians is debatable,
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because it is unclear what body of law the US Supreme Court would use to
evaluate any Hawaiian cases in a post–federal recognition context. Moreover,
whether the legislation for Hawaiian federal recognition would itself withstand a
constitutional challenge has yet to be fully explored. The issue of whether the US
Congress has the authority to enter into this sort of trust relationship with Hawai-
ians is dependent on authority under the Indian Commerce clause of the US Con-
stitution. The US Department of Justice has not yet taken a position as to whether
Hawaiians could fall under that clause for these purposes (Dunford 2003).
16 See Morse 1999; Pang 1995; Hawaii Advisory Committee to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights 1991; Faludi 1991; Federal-State Task Force
on the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act 1983; and Uyehara 1977.
17 On 15 October 1993, the Secretary of the Interior published a list of fed-
erally recognized tribes that included Alaska Native villages as tribal entities. The
preamble read, “the villages and regional tribes [are] listed as distinctly Native
communities and have the same status as tribes in the contiguous 48 states”
(narf 1994). But there is currently a debate over Alaska Natives’ legal status, as
evinced in Republican Senator Ted Stevens’s push to consolidate governmental
funding for these entities into regional organizations, and in Don Mitchell’s asser-
tion that the Department of the Interior acted unlawfully when it put the villages
on the federal list. See Indianz.com 2003. 
18 The $70-million-dollar figure is a high-end estimate put forth by the Coun-
cil for Native Hawaiian Advancement—a pro–federal recognition consortium.
The State of Hawai‘i budget figures for 2003 can be found on the state budget /
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Abstract
This essay examines the politics of the controversial proposal for US federal
recognition for Native Hawaiians. It explores a range of historical and legal issues
that shed light on the multiple claims that constitute the complex terrain of
Hawaiian sovereignty politics. The article provides a historical overview of the
events that impact the current situation and then discusses a particular set of con-
temporary conditions that serve as key elements in catalyzing widespread support
for federal recognition—namely, the implications of the recent US Supreme Court
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ruling in Rice v Cayetano and subsequent legal challenges to Native Hawaiian
programs and funding by the US government. It also highlights difficulties with
the promise of federal recognition as a solution to “the Hawaiian problem” by
looking at lessons from Indian Country, Native Alaska, and the Pacific—espe-
cially the US unincorporated territories. Finally, the essay explores the indepen-
dence movement as an alternative to domestic dependent nationhood.
keywords: Native Hawaiians, sovereignty, United States, federal recognition,
indigenous politics, land, self-governance
 
